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This Brief is submitted by the Utility Shareholder 
Association of Utah, Alex Oblad and Harold Burton, shareholders 
of Mountain Fuel Supply Company, all of which are collectively 
referred to herein as the "Plaintiffs", in answer to the brief 
of the Utah Department of Administrative Services ("Department") 
and the brief of the Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens 
("Coalition") in support of their petitions for a writ of 
certiorari to set aside the Report and Order issued by the 
Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission") on 
December 31, 1981 ("Order") adopting a stipulation and 
agreement ("Agreement") • 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS OF THE 
COALITION AND THE DEPARTMENT 
It is apparent from the briefs of the Department and 
Coalition that their principal objection to the Order is that 
it is in violation of this Court's decision in Committee of 
Consumer Services v. Public Service Commission, 595 P.2d 871 
1 The following abbreviations are used for the 
purpose of citation in this brief: (1) "Dept. Br." refers to 
the brief of the Utah Department of Administrative Services; 
(2) "Coalition Br." refers to the brief of the Utah State 
Coalition of Senior Citizens; (3) "Ord." refers to the Report 
and Order on Stipulation and Agreement issued by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah on December 31, 1981; (4) "Tr." 
refers to the transcript of the evidentiary hearings before the 
Commission commencing October 14, 1981. 
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(Utah 1979), hereinafter referred to as the "Wexpro Decision". 
(Dept. Br. at 71-76; Coalition Br. at 2-23.) 2 
The Department contends that the Order violates the 
Wexpro Decision mandate because: 1) the Court ordered an 
evidentiary hearing but the only hearing conducted by the 
Commission was on the Agreement; 2) the Court said to conduct a 
hearing to classify properties as utility or non-utility, but 
·.,. 
there was no hearing; 3) the Court said that any transfer must 
be for fair market value and in the public interest, but there 
was no "reasoned determination" in that regard. ( Dept . Br . at 
11.) The Department says the Order is defective because it is 
the result of a "compromise--plain and simple". (Dept. Br. at 
12.) 
The Coalition objects to the Order for similar 
reasons. It says the Commission failed to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to classify properties and failed to 
conduct a hearing to determine the fair market value of 
properties. (Coalition Br. at 5, 6.) The Coalition states 
that the only way to arrive at a fair market value is to place 
an actual monetary value on properties transferred and that 
fair market value can only be arrived at through litigation. 
2 The Department contends that the Order is in 
"wholesale violation" of the Wexpro Decision (Dept. Br. at 
71-75.). Likewise, the Coalition argues that the Order 
"violates", and is "per se incompatible" and "inconsistent" 
with the Wexpro Decision. (Coalition Br. at 7-23.) 
-2-
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_Furthermore, both the Coalition and Department assert that each 
of the legal principles enunciated in the Wexpro Decision may 
only be resolved through litigation. Because an agency has a 
duty to comply with a reviewing court's mandate, the Coalition 
and Department argue, controversies on remand cannot be 
resolved through settlement. (Dept. Br. at 72; Coalition Br. 
at 14-19.) 
A common sense analysis of the arguments presented by 
the Coalition and the Department points out the fallacy 
therein. For example, the Department and Coalition would have 
this Commission spend its valuable time and resources 
conducting a hearing to classify properties as utility or 
non-utility because the Wexpro Decision under the facts then 
before the Court, instructs the Commission to do so for the 
purpose of determining whether or not the properties must be 
transferred for fair market value. 595 P.2d at 878. It is 
obviously unnecessary for the Commission to conduct such a 
hearing inasmuch as the properties which are the subject of the 
Agreement are treated in the Agreement as utility properties, 
i.e., all transfers are made for fair market value. The 
Department and coalition's argument that fair market value can 
only be arrived at through full litigation is wholly without 
foundation. To say that adverse parties, calling upon their 
own and other's expertise, cannot during the course of an 
arm's-length transaction arrive at fair market value, is 
-3-
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absurd. This happens in every day business transactions 
between individuals seeking to protect their personal 
interests. However, it is not necessary to debate whether or 
not it was possible for the parties, through negotiations, to 
determine fair market value inasmuch as the record establishes 
through testimony of numerous expert witnesses that the 
consideration provided for in the agreement constitutes fair 
market value which is customary in the industry. 3 
Furthermore, the Commission found, based on competent evidence, 
that the Agreement conforms to the legal principles set forth 
in the Wexpro Decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR BY ENTERING AN 
ORDER BASED UPON A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
The thrust of the Coalition and Department's objection 
to the Order is that it is based upon a settlement. As pointed 
3 Herman G. Roseman testified for the Committee and 
the Division that royalty payments allowed in the stipulation 
and agreement are fair market consideration which is standard . 
in the industry given the difficulty and expense of determining 
the actual value of oil and gas reserves. (Tr. 1026, 1029, 
1045, 1046, and 1047.) Howard Ritzma also testified for the 
Division and the Committee that the consideration provided for 
in the stipulation and agreement constitute fair market consi-
deration which is customary in the industry. (Tr. 1250, 1251, 
1252) Mr. Ritzma further testified that it is essentially 
impossible to arrive at the value of oil and gas in unexplored 
properties and that it is not practice in the industry to 
convey such properties for actual dollar values. (Tr. 1263 and 
1274). R. D. Cash, Ralph Kirsch, Lyle Hale provided similar 
testimony. (Tr. 1502, 1515, 1520, 1331, 1333 - 1335.) 
-4-
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out above, that objection, on its face, is flawed. This is 
particularly true given the fact that the Commission did not 
adopt the Agreement without first giving it very careful 
scrutiny. The Order contains specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which are amply supported in the record of 
the Commission proceedings, that the Agreement is in the public 
interest, provides for fair market consideration and is 
other~ise consistent with the Wexpro Decision. 4 
Additionally, the Commission properly concluded in the Order 
that it has jurisdiction to resolve the pending controversies 
by negotiated settlement (Ord. at 20) and further recognized 
that it was with the encouragement of the Commission, that the 
parties engaged in settlement negotiations which ultimately 
resulted in the Agreement. (Ord. at 14.) Indeed, as part of 
its broad discretionary authority to regulate the business of 
utilities, the Commission enjoys specific statutory authority 
to resolve this and other controversies thro~gh settlement. 
4 After eight days of hearings during which the 
Commission received the evidence of renowned experts in utility 
law and carefully scrutinized the Agreement, the Commission 
found each aspect of the Agreement to conform with the Wexpro 
Decision. Specifically, the Commission made findings of fact 
that the division of properties contained in the Agreement is 
for fair market value as typically determined in the industry 
(Ord. at 19; Findings 10 and 11) and that the Agreement is in 
the oublic interest. (Ord. at 19.) The Commission made 
simiiar conclusions of law, i.e., the Agreement is in the 
public interest (Ord. at 21; Conclusions 4, 5, and 6) and that 
any transfers are for fair market value. (Ord. at 21.) 
-5-
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A. The Commission is Vested with Express 
Statutory Authority to Adopt a 
Settlement Agreement; the Fact that a 
Controversy is Terminated by Settlement 
Cannot, By Itself, Serve As the Basis 
for Setting Aside a Commission Order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (Supp. 1981) vests the 
Commission with power and jurisdiction to "supervise all of the 
business of every .•. public utility in this state 
and in exercise of that authority to do all things that are 
" , 
"necessary or convenient." In carrying out its functions, the 
Commission enjoys a wide latitude of discretion. This Court 
has repeatedly stressed the broad discretionary powers of the 
Commission and administrative agencies generally. Williams v. 
Public Service Commission, 645 P.2d 600. (Utah 1982); Utah Gas 
Service Co. v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 18 Utah 2d 310, 422 P.2d 
530 (1967); Petty v. Utah State Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299 
(Utah 1979); Mantua Town v. Carr, 584 P.2d 912 (Utah 1978). 
However, it is not necessary to look to the Commission's 
general and broad discretionary powers to find its authority to 
enter an order based upon settlement. That authority is 
expressly granted in a recent enactment of the Utah 
Legislature. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-10(1) (Supp. 1981) provides 
as follows: 
At anv time before or during a hearing or 
proceeding before the commission the parties 
-6-
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between themselves or with the commission or 
any commissioner, may engage in settlement 
conferences and negotiations. The 
commission may at its sole discretion adopt 
any settlement proposal of the parties and 
enter an order based upon such proposal if 
it deems such action proper. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Legislature has further provided that "no 
informality of any proceeding •.• shall invalidate any order 
made by the commission." Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1 
(Supp. 19 81) • 
Thus the Utah Legislature has expressly endowed the 
Commission with the authority and jurisdiction to adopt a 
settlement proposal "at any time" if the Commission finds "in 
its sole discretion", that the proposal is proper. The 
Legislature has not qualified its grant of authority to the 
Commission with a requirement that the Commission only allow a 
settlement of those matters which are not on remand from this 
Court. In fact, by statutory mandate, it is impermissible to 
set aside a commission order for the simple reason that it is 
based on a settlement proposal. 
Where legislative intent is clear and unambiguous, 
"the courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce 
the law according to its terms." (Citation omitted.) Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 
502, 155 P.2d 184, 185 (1945). Plaintiffs do not contend that 
-7-
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in making a determination that a settlement is proper the 
Commission can ignore the legal principles enunciated by this 
Courts The Commission must do so and has done so. After eight 
days of hearings and careful scrutiny of the Agreement and 
examination of expert witnesses presented by the parties to the 
Agreement as well as by the Coalition, the Commission found the 
settlement to be consistent with and not in violation of the 
legal principles set forth by this Court in the Wexpro Decision. 
B. The Function of This Court Upon Review of a 
Commission Decision is to Determine Whether 
or Not the Commission Regularly Pursued its 
Authority; Judicial Action Cannot Supplant 
the Discretionary Authority of the 
Commission. 
The Coalition acknowledges that the Commission has 
broad statutory authority to adopt settlement proposals, but 
states that that authority does not give the Commission "a 
blank check to approve settlements." (Coalition Br. at 7.) 
Plaintiffs, as stated above, do not dispute that the Commission 
in approving the Agreement must follow the legal principles set 
forth by this Court in the Wexpro Decision. Plaintiffs 
disagree with the conclusion of the Coalition, however, that it 
follows from the proposition that the Commission cannot adopt a 
settlement which is incompatible with law or incompatible with 
the "law of the case" that it cannot properly adopt the 
Agreement. 
-8-
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Simply stated, it is the function of a court to 9oint 
out to an agency its legal errors, and once that agency has 
corrected those errors it may proceed to carry out its 
legislative charge as it chooses within the bounds of its 
statutory authority. K. Davis, Administrative Law, § 18.12 
(1974); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 
(1940); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); FPC v. Idaho 
Power Co., 344 U.S. 17 (1952); ~LRB v. Food Store Employees, 
417 U.S. 1 (1974). While a lower court may be required ·to 
strictly adhere to a superior court's instructions on remand, 
an administrative agency is not so bound. The reason is that 
courts and agencies derive from different origins and have 
diverse responsibilities. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 
309 U.S. at 141, 142. The Commission, for example, is an 
extension of the legislative branch of government and possesses 
certain statutory prerogatives separate and distinct from the 
prerogatives of the judiciary. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcastinq 
Co., 309 U.S. at 141; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 155 P.2d at 188. The judiciary must 
observe the proper distribution of powers between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branch of governments and 
may not usurp the discretionary authority of the Commission in 
its regulation of the business of public utilities. Utah Light 
& Traction Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 
P.2d 683 (Utah 1941). 
-9-
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The cases cited by the Department and the Coalition 
for the proposition that the Commission must literally comply 
with the directions contained in the Wexpro Decision either 
support the principle stated herein or are clearly 
distinguishable and not applicable. 5 Both the Department and 
the Coalition place considerable reliance in support of their 
contention upon the United States Supreme Court decision, Utah 
Public Service Commission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 
464 (1969), wherein, in the context of anti-trust litigation, 
the Supreme Court ordered the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah to comply with its previous mandate that a 
decree be entered requiring a company to divest itself of 
5 FCC v. Pottsville Broadcastin~ Co., 309 U.S. 134 
(1940); Chicago and Northwestern Transpor ation Co. v. United 
States, 574 F.2d 926; Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 
F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953); and City of Cleveland, Ohio v. FPC, 
561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977) are cited by the Coalition in 
support of its argument that the Commission must follow the 
mandate of a reviewing court. (Coalition Br. at 3-5.) Each of 
these cases recognize, however, that the mandate of a court to 
an agency can go no further than to point out the legal error 
of the agency, leaving the agency free, once it has corrected 
the error, to proceed to carry out its legislative charge. 
Accord, Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224 (2nd Cir. 1980) 
(Dept. Br. at 73.) Other cases cited by the Department and 
Coalition are not pertinent because they speak of the duty of a 
court to respect the mandate of another court. Utah Public 
Service Cornrn'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 364 (1969); 
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); 
Cascade Natural Gas Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 
129 (1967); Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 334 U.S. 304 
(1948); Tovrea v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 195, 419 P.2d 79 
(1966) (Coalition Br. at 3, 8; Dept. Br. at 73, 74). 
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another company. In this case the Supreme Court obviously 
enforced its mandate beyond the requirement that the District 
Court correct its errois of law. However, this case is not 
pertinent to the pending matter inasmuch as it involves the 
directions of a court to another court. As pointed out above, 
there is a great and respected distinction between the extent 
to which a court can compel another court to follow 
instructions on remand and- the extent to which a court can 
compel an administrative agency, as an arm of the legislature, 
to take specific actions which fall within its regulatory 
jurisdiction. 
The discrete and difterent responsibilities of the 
Commission and the judiciary are found in statutory law and 
have been faithfully respected by this Court. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-16 (1973) provides in pertinent part that the Supreme 
Court's review of a Commission decision shall "not be ~xtended 
further than to determine whether the commission has regularly 
pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the 
order or decision under review violates any right of the 
petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or the 
State of Utah." It is not within the province of the judiciary 
to issue specific instructions to the Commission as to how it 
must carry out its regulatory functions. That is made clear in 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Company v. Public Service 
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Commission, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184 (1945) where this Court 
considered the effect of its earlier decision setting aside and 
remanding an order of the CoMmission. The Court disagreed with 
the contention of the Commission that the court held in its 
earlier review proceedings that certain utility charges were 
discriminatory, and in so doing discussed the limited functions 
of the Supreme Court in reviewing a Commission order. The 
court stated: 
It is urged by the Commission that this 
court did not sustain the charges made by 
the utility pending review; that we in fact 
held that such charges were discriminatory. 
This position misconceives the function of 
this court in reviewing an order of the 
Commission. We, of course, in rendering our 
decision, acted within the scooe of our 
authority. Consequently, we determined 
merely that the Commission had not regularly 
pursued its authority. Everything else 
stated in our opinion was in response to 
contentions of the plaintiff relative to 
confiscatory rates, arbitrary action by the 
Commission in respects other than those by 
us sustained, etc. But because we in the 
rationale of the opinion found that such 
contentions should be overruled, it does not 
follow that we determined that the rates 
charged by the utility were unjust, 
unreasonable or confiscatory. We did not so 
determine simply because that is not our 
function. Indeed, it is not a judicial 
function. It is legislative and is to be 
exercised by the arm of the legislature--the 
Public Service Commission. (Emphasis added.) 
155 P.2d at 187, 188. 
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The court noted that its limited function with respect 
to Commission decisions is founded in Section 76-6-16 of the 
Utah Code cited above, stating: 
Ample authority exists in the Commission to 
determine reasonable rates. The authority 
comes from the legislature not from this 
court. It must be clear that we did not 
thus offhandedly assume authority which this 
court has consistently asserted was not by 
the legislature conferred upon it. Nor does 
the fact that by the provisions of Sec. 
76-3-1, U.C.A. 1943 every unjust and 
unreasonable charge made by a utility for 
services is prohibited and made unlawful, 
confer authority upon this court to modify 
an order of the Commission or to uphold an 
order in part and set it aside in part. 
This for the reason that the determination 
of whether a rate or charge is unreasonable 
or is unjust is placed by law in the 
Commission and not in the courts. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Id. at 188. 
Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion, made it 
clear that a court reviewing does not issue instructions: 
We never, by affirmance or vacation of the 
Commission's order, approve or disapprove of 
a rate order. We only determine whether it 
has been arrived at by a regular pursuit of 
the Commission's authority and whether there 
is evidence to sustain it. 
* * * 
There is no middle ground. We cannot 
modify. We cannot remand with directions to 
fix a certain rate. We "set aside" which 
leaves the Conmission free properly to find 
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the rate level which it did not do before. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Id$ at 190. 
Justice Wolfe stressed the importance that the 
judiciary not invade the legislative realm and offered the 
following guidance to his fellow members of the judiciary: 
But where he does not think that reasonable 
minds could differ, as on the question of 
whether what we are asked to do is really 
legislation, it is his duty to stay within 
the province of the judiciary and restrain 
from invading the province of the 
legislature despite his personal longings 
for a different result. 
Id. at 191. In accord, Williams v. Public Service Commmision, 
645 P.2d 600 (Utah, 1982); PBI Freight Service v. Public 
Service Commission, 626 P.2d 408 (Utah 1981); Utah Light & 
Traction Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 
P.2d 683 (1941) (In reviewing an order of the Commission, 
judicial action cannot supplant the discretionary authority of 
the Commission); Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission, 80 Utah 455, 15 P.2d 358 (1932); Mulcahy v. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 {1941); Union 
Pacific R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 102 Utah 465, 132 
P$2d 128 (1942); Goodrich v. Public Service Commission, 114 
Utah 296, 198 P.2d 975 (1948); Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, 
Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011 (1959). 
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In its most recent discussion of the limitation of its 
authority to review a Commission decision, this Court upheld 
the Commission's exparte dismissal of a complaint upon its 
finding that there was no violation of Utah law. Giving due 
respect to the authority of the Commission to dispose of 
matters in a summary fashion, this Court stated: 
These statutes enabled Industrial to 
bring its complaint against the Mobile 
corporations and allowed the PSC to.consider 
it exparte. Rule 13 of the PSC's Rules of 
Procedure allows the Commission to dispose 
of the complaint without a hearing. Under 
this rule the contesting party may lodge a 
protest stating why a hearing should be held 
and have the protest reviewed by the 
Commission. In this instance because it 
appeared to the PSC that there was no 
violation of Utah law, the Commission 
concluded that a hearing on Industrial's 
complaint was unnecessary and followed its 
Rule 13 by dismissing the complaint. 
Although Industrial petitioned for a 
rehearing, it was considered by the PSC but 
denied. In so doing, the Commission acted 
within the scone of its own rules and 
statutory authority. (Emphasis added.) 
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 645 P.2d at 601 (Utah 
1982). 
The distinctions between the responsibility of the 
judiciary and the Commission must be observed. It is the 
Commission's province to regulate the business of utilities and 
the judiciary's function to review the lawfulness of Commission 
decisions. Just as it is not appropriate for courts to 
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instruct the Commission as to what is a "reasonable rate", it 
is beyond the judicial province to direct the Commission as to 
how it must deal with a utility proposal for the division of 
property and allocation of benefits. That is a statutory 
prerogative of the Commission subject only to the limitation 
that its decision be made in the regular pursuit of its 
authority. 
This Court's recognition of the separate 
responsibilities of the Commission and the judiciary is 
important in two respects. It is instructive as to the meaning 
and operative effect of the Wexpro Decision and offers guidance 
in the review of the Order which is on appeal. It is clear 
that the impact of the Wexpro Decision is to point out the 
legal deficiency in the Commission's earlier order approving a 
purchase and sale agreement and joint exploration agreement 
between Wexpro and Mountain Fuel Supply Company, and to offer 
guidance to be observed by the Commission in reconsidering 
those matters. The scope of review in the matter at hand is 
the same. This Court, however, is not asked to rule upon the 
propriety of the purchase and sale agreement and joint 
exploration and development agreement which were the subject of 
the Commission's former order, but is asked to look at a wholly 
new transaction. The question before the court now is whether 
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the Commission regularly pursued its authority in approving the 
Agreement which the Commission found after eight days of 
hearings and careful scrutiny to be in the public interest and 
consistent with the legal principles enunciated in the Wexpro 
Decision. In making this determination, full recognition must 
be given to the Utah statutory law which provides the 
Commission with broad discretionary authority to adopt 
settlement proposals. The Order may not be set aside for the 
sole reason that it is based on a settlement. 
II. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES INVOLVING 
UTILITIES ARE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. 
The Coalition and Department stress the fact that the 
Agreement was entered solely for the purpose of avoiding 
litigation and for that reason the Order is inherently 
deficient. (Dept. Br. at 61; Coalition Br. at 12-15.) 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the termination of lengthy 
litigation was not an important goal of the parties to the 
Agreement. Plaintiffs further concede that it has supported 
the Agreement on the basis that stability and certainty would 
at last prevail. In fact, the importance of obtaining 
certainty through a final resolution of this matter is the 
subject of Plaintiffs' petition in these proceedings. The 
termination of costly litigation and the achievement of 
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certainty are recognized to be important benefits of settlement 
which serve the public interest and should not be denigrated in 
these proceedings. 
In Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 1242 
(D.C. Cir. 1972), the Court refused to set aside an order of 
the Federal Power Commission approving a "stipulation and 
agreement" with respect to rate issues and in so doing noted 
that all parties do not have to consent to a settlement if the 
agency reviewing the settlement finds that its terms are 
equitable. 463 F.2d at 1246. Settlement carries a different 
meaning and connotation in administrative law than it does in 
court actions. While a court resolves only those issues that 
are presented by litigants and can allow the matter to be 
resolved th~ough settlement only if all parties agree, 
regulatory agencies have a broader scope of responsibility to 
make decisions in the public interest. As does Utah statutory 
law, the federal law provides an administrative agency with 
specific authority to resolve a matter through settlement. 
Administrative Procedure Act§ 554(c) (5 u.s.c. § 554 (c)}. 
The Pennsylvania decision emphasized the importance of the 
settlement prerogative as follows: 
Only by exercising such •.. "administra~ive 
settlement" procedures when called for can 
the usual interminable length of regulatory 
agency proceedings be brought within the 
bounds of reason and the agencies' 
competence to deal with them. 
-18-
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Id. at 1246. 
The legislative history of § 554(c) recognizes, said 
the Pennsylvania court, that it is "of greatest importance to 
the functioning of the administrative process" and it is 
further the whole purpose of the informal settlement provision: 
to eliminate the need for often costly and 
lengthy formal hearings in those cases where 
the parties are able to reach a result of 
their own which the appropriate agency finds 
compatible with the public interest. 
Id. at 1247. 
Settlement agreements are encouraged for the distinct 
purpose of "setting rights, [and] providing for stability in 
the exercise of those rights .• II Continental Oil Co. v. 
FPC, 373 F.2d 96, 100 (10th Cir. 1967). Informal disposition 
is the lifeblood of the administrative process. Local 282, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 795 
(2d Cir. 1964). Cities of Lexington v. FPC, 295 F.2d 109 (4th 
Cir. 1961). Where an agency finds a settlement proposal to be 
in the public interest, it need not conduct a formal hearing. 
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. FERC, 659 F.2d 509 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
The importance of the settlement process to 
administrative agencies was emphasized, and the liberality of 
agency discretion in that regard was observed by the court in 
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Cities of Lexington v. FPC, supra, in response to a party's 
contention that the Federal Power Commission could not suspend 
a rate increase and announce that a hearing would be had and 
thereafter, without the unanimous consent of interested parties 
adopt a settlement. The Court stated: 
[I]t goes without saying that there is no 
substance to the suggestion that if the 
Commission at the time of suspension 
announces that a hearing will be held the 
hearing must be held no matter _how futile or 
unnecessary it thereafter becomes by reason 
of a settlement. No court of law would 
tolerate for a moment the idea that it would 
be obliged to try a case that had been 
assigned for hearing notwithstanding the 
fact that the parties had reached a 
settlement of the controversy. Much less 
such a contention be considered here with 
reference to the ruling of an administrative 
tribunal where liberality of procedure is 
essential in the interest of the disoatch of 
business . ( Emphasis added . } 
295 F.2d at 121. 
That the law favors settlement of disputes is without 
question. Placid Oil Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Amoco Production Co. v. FPC, 465 F.2d 1350 {10th Cir. 1972); 
Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 373 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1967}; Texas 
Eastern Transmission Corn. v. FPC, 306 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1962). 
The fact that the Agreement was entered in part to 
terminate costly litigation and to provide certainty with 
respect to the manner in which properties can be developed 
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does not detract from the lawfulness of the Order. The 
importance of these benefits of settlement are universally 
acknowledged and form the policy considerations which underlie 
settlement statutes. In enacting § 54-7-10, Utah Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1981) providing for settlement, the Utah legislature 
necessarily recognized that resolution of controversy through 
settlement is in the public interest. The legislature also 
~ 
recognized that in reaching settlement parties may compromise 
their views. The Department and the Coalition's continued 
negative reference to the motivations of the parties to the 
Agreement is deceptive and in conflict with the law. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are in complete agreement with the 
Department and Coalition that the Order should be set aside but 
for.wholly different reasons. The Utility Shareholder 
Association supported the Commission's approval and adoption of 
the Agreement based on its understanding that the Commission 
would render an order that is final and res judicata so that 
those complex and divisive issues resulting from the Wexpro 
Decision can at last be put to rest. On the other hand, the 
Coalition and Department seek to invalidate the Agreement for 
the purpose of extending the controversy through costly 
litigation. 
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The Coalition and Department state that the Commission 
erred by not precisely following the mandate of this Court in 
the Wexpro Decision. In fact, the Commission precisely 
followed that mandate. In rendering the Order, the Commission 
corrected the legal errors inherent in earlier proceedings 
involving different transactions and exercised its statutory 
prerogative to resolve the controversy through settlement. 
The fact that in arriving at the Agreement, the 
parties thereto may have compromised their initial positions, 
does not mean that there has been a compromise of the legal 
principles announced in the Wexpro Decision. The Commission's 
f indi~gs that the Agreement is consonant with the Wexpro 
Decision is based upon its independent examination of the 
Agreement and the evidence presented to it during eight days of 
hearings. The Coalition participated in those hearings and was 
not timid in presenting its opposition to the Agreement. The 
Commission's Order is not based on a one sided view but arises 
out of an adversarial proceeding. The parties may have 
compromised their positions but the Commission did not do so. 
Plaintiffs recognize that this Court should perform a 
substantial and meaningful review of the Order and encourages 
it to do so. Silver Beehive Telephone Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 30 Utah 2d 44, 512 P.2d 1327 (1973). However, in 
conducting that review, due respect should be afforded to the 
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jurisdiction and authority of the Commission to resolve 
disputes through settlement. Given the underlying and well 
recognized policy considerations favoring settlement, the 
Commission should be accorded the widest latitude of discretion. 
1982. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 W day of Jwij 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
7 
Attorneys for 
Utility Shareholder 
Association of Utah, 
Alex Oblad and Harold Burton 
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